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LEGISLATION 
THE 1977 MARYLAND WIRETAPPING AND 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a comprehen-
sive Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act,l patterned after 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.2 
Consolidating prior wiretapping .and bugging provisions in the 
Maryland Code, the 1977 Maryland law expands the permitted use of 
participant monitoring and provides a civil remedy for violations 
under the Act. This article will trace the history of Maryland 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws, contrasting the pres-
ent Act with previous Maryland law and with corresponding federal 
provisions. Suggestions for clarification 'and changes to the Act will 
be drawn from various sources. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Federal History in a Nutshell 
During the first half of this century, the Supreme Court did not 
regard wiretapping as a search and seizure within the context of the 
fourth amendment, since wiretapping could be conducted without 
physical invasion of person or property.3 In handing down its 
landmark decision in Katz v. United States, 4 the Court not only 
rejected the physical invasion theory, but laid the groundwork for 
enactment the following year of a comprehensive federal wiretap-
ping statute, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968.5 The Katz Court refused to "retroactively validate"6 an 
unauthorized wiretap even though the investigating agents had 
carefully circumscribed their search. Only if a magistrate issued a 
pre-search order establishing precise limits for the search, and was 
later informed of all that had been "seized" would the agents' 
conduct be proper under the fourth amendment.? 
1. Act of May 26, 1977, ch. 692, 1977 Md. Laws 2798. 
2. 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 (1970). 
3. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Title III). 
6. 389 U.S. at 356. 
7. Wiretapping would be found to be permissible where conducted "in response to a 
detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense 
... for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the 
affidavit's allegations." Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966) 
(emphasis added). 
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In Berger v. New York,s the Court set exacting guidelines for 
constitutional wiretapping and electronic surveillance,9 many of 
which were adopted by Title III. Included among the Berger 
requirements were: 
(1) a neutral magistrate; 
(2) a warrant stating with particularity the specific 
crime which had been or was being committed and the type 
of conversation sought; 
(3) an authorization period of less than two months; 
(4) a showing of probable cause for extensions of the 
authorization period; 
(5) a termination date for interception set for the date 
on which the conversation sought is obtained; 
(6) a giving of notice to the subject of the wiretap or a 
showing of exigent circumstances justifying the failure to 
give notice; and 
(7) a return of the warrant and all seized materials to 
the issuing magistrate. 
B. Early Maryland History 
Well before the turn of the century, Maryland felt compelled to 
enact legislation of its own to protect against unnecessary intrusion 
into its citizens' privacy.lO The common law crime of sitting under 
the eaves of a house to overhear the latest gossip became a more 
serious and less discoverable offense with the development of 
electronic communications systems.II 
Since 1868, Maryland has provided criminal penalties for 
telegraph company employees who divulged the contents of 
messages. I2 With the arrival of the telephone, the law was expanded 
8. 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
9. Electronic surveillance, as distinguished from wiretapping, is not restricted to 
interception of telephone conversations; rather, it includes any interception of 
oral communications through means of an electronic device. 
10. See, e.g., Act of March 30, 1868, ch. 471 § 135, 1868 Md. Laws 911 (current version 
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976». 
11. Due to the rapid growth of technology, many electronic eavesdropping devices 
have been developed that could not have been foreseen by the drafters of early 
electronic surveillance legislation. Consequently, there has been much litigation 
over whether such items as pen registers (devices which record the telephone 
numbers dialed from a particular line) are within the purview of state and federal 
laws. The Supreme Court recently set the question to rest for future federal cases 
in United States v. New York Telephone Co., in which the Court held that pen 
registers were not covered by Title III. 98 S. Ct. 364 (1977). See also Dowling, 
Bumper Beepers and the Fourth Amendment, 13 CRIM. L. BUL. 266 (1977) 
(discussing radio devices used to track moving automobiles); Hodges, Electronic 
Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 
3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261 (1976) (discussing visual surveillance methods). 
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976) (repealed 1977). 
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to penalize individuals "connected with any telegraph or telephone 
corporation, company or individuals operating said lines for profit in 
this State, either as clerk, operator, messenger, or in any other 
capacity, who shall wilfully divulge the contents or nature of the 
contents of any private communication entrusted to him for 
transmission or delivery."13 The penalty for violation of Maryland's 
early eavesdropping law was a maximum three months imprison-
ment or a $500 fine or both. 
Despite such legislative exhortations against the interception of 
private communications, evidence procured through means of 
wiretapping has not always been inadmissible in Maryland courts. 
In Hitzelberger v. State,14 the Maryland Court of Appeals held that 
evidence obtained by wiretapping could be admitted, even though a 
Maryland law15 expressly made evidence derived from an illegal 
search and seizure inadmissible in a trial of misdemeanors. The 
Hitzelberger court based its holding on the absence of language in 
the Bouse Act16 specifically referring to the interception of wire 
communiGations.17 
Like the early Supreme Court cases, the Hitzelberger court 
adopted the stance that investigation by wiretapping did not violate 
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.18 Similarly, the interception was not made illegal by 
Congressional enactment of the Federal Communications Act of 
1934,19 which proscribed interception of wire communications. The 
Hitzelberger court observed that the federal Act applied only to 
interstate or foreign communications. Five years later in Weiss v. 
United States,20 the Supreme Court expanded the Federal Communi-
cations Act to prohibit the interception of intrastate as well as 
interstate communications.21 Even though the Weiss court broad-
ened the reach of the federal Act, the Maryland Court of Appeals in 
13. Act of April 10, 1900, ch. 610, § 252, 1900 Md. Laws 941 (current version at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 556 (1976). 
14. 174 Md. 152, 197 A. 605 (1938). 
15. Bouse Act, ch. 194, 1929 Md. Laws 533. 
16. [d. 
17. Accord, Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 285,23 A.2d 706, 709 (1942). The Act stated in 
part, that 
[n]o evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible 
where the same shall have been procured by, through, or in consequence 
of any illegal search or seizure, ... nor ... if procured by, through or in 
consequence of a search and seizure, the effect of the admission of which 
would be to compel one to give evidence against himself in a criminal 
case. 
Bouse Act, ch. 194, § 4A, 1929 Md. Laws 533. 
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
19. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). 
20. 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
21. See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (derivative evidence also 
inadmissible); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence obtained 
in violation of Federal Communications Act inadmissible in federal court). 
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McGuire v. State22 commented that messages made inadmissible in 
federal court were not automatically made inadmissible in a 
Maryland court.23 
Not until the mid-1950's did Maryland have statutory guidelines 
for court-ordered wiretapping and admissibility of wiretapping 
evidence. In 1956, the Maryland General Assembly passed the 
Maryland Wiretapping Act,24 which set standards for all state-
conducted wiretapping. Together with the subsequently-adopted 
Title III federal requirements25 and the Maryland Electronic 
Surveillance Act,26 the Maryland Wiretapping Act remained the 
state's governing law for more than twenty years. Announcing the 
policy against the "interception and divulgence of a private 
communication by any person not a party thereto ... except by 
court order in unusual circumstances,"27 the Act declared that 
"detection of the guilty does not justify investigative methods which 
infringe upon the liberties of the innocent."2B 
Under the 1956 Act, telephonic or telegraphic communications 
could be intercepted only upon ap'plication to a circuit court judge or 
judge of the Baltimore City Supreme Bench by the attorney general 
or a state's attorney. The applicant was required to set forth 
circumstances necessitating a wiretap and to state reasonable 
grounds for believing that "a crime has been ... or is about to be 
committed"29 or that "evidence will be obtained essential to the 
solution of such crime."30 The Act further required a showing that 
there' were no other means readily available for obtaining the 
information other than through wiretapping. If the statements made 
in the application were based solely on "information and belief,"31 
the applicant had to give grounds for his belief. To insure minimum 
infringement upon privacy, the particular telephone or telegraph line 
from which information was obtained had to be identified as fully as 
possible. For the same reason, no order could be effective longer than 
thirty days, after which time it could be renewed or continued for 
another thirty-day period upon application by the same officer who 
22. 200 Md. 601, 92 A.2d 582 (1952). 
23. According to the McGuire court, the federal statute is " 'presumed to be limited in 
effect to the federal jurisdiction and not to supersede a state's exercise of its 
police power unless there be clear manifestation to the contrary.''' Id. at 607, 92 
A.2d at 584 (quoting Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 16, 68 
N.E.2d 854, 855 (1946». 
24. Wiretapping Act, ch. 116, 1956 Md. Laws 294 (repealed and recodified 1973). 
25. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212, 
ch. 119 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970». 
26. Electronic Surveillance Act, ch. 706, 1959 Md. Laws 1065 (repealed 1977). 
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 92 (1971) (repealed and recodified 1973). 
28. [d. 
29. [d. § 94(a)(1). 
30. [d. § 94(a)(2). 
31. [d. § 94(b). 
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originally secured the warrant. For failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Act in obtaining evidence, that evidence would 
be rendered inadmissible in court, and the violator subjected to a 
possible fine of $1,000 or maximum sentence of ninety days, or 
both.32 
In Manger v. State,33 the first case interpreting the 1956 
Wiretapping Act, police conducted a wiretap on a telephone to 
monitor incoming bets on horse races. The police obtained a search 
warrant for the premises and subsequently arrested the appellants, 
who contended at trial that all information illegally obtained in the 
wiretap had to be excluded from admission into evidence. Rejecting 
the appellants' contention, the court explained that they had no 
standing to complain since they were not participants in the 
overheard conversations. Their situation was compared to that of 
persons who, by virtue of holding no proprietary interest in the 
premises searched, had no standing to charge police with an illegal 
search and seizure.34 
The next Maryland case decided under the 1956 wiretapping 
statute, Robert v. State,35 declared that the admissibility of evidence 
derived from the wiretap of an interstate telephone. call was not 
controlled solely by the Federal Communications Act. Holding that 
the federal statute was applicable to intrastate as well as interstate 
calls, the court emphasized that the federal Act has not preempted 
the field. 36 The court cited Schwartz v. Texas 37 for the proposition 
that evidence obtained in violation of the federal Act may be 
admitted in a state prosecution if permitted by state law. According 
to the Robert court, the supremacy clause created no conflict between 
federal and state acts. The state Act, the court commented, "simply 
excludes evidence obtained in violation of the state statute, which 
would otherwise be admissible . . . notwithstanding the Federal 
Act."38 
In Robert, the police listened to a conversation by means of a 
headset connected with a hotel telephone switchboard, without 
obtaining the consent of the parties or complying with the 
32. Essentially the same penalty was added to Article 27 of the 1957 Cumulative 
Supplement of the Maryland Code at § 670A. Those persons subject to penalties 
were "[alny [one] who shall wilfully intercept or tap any telephone or telegraphic 
communication in any manner other than pursuant to an order under the 
provisions of §§ 100 to 107 ... of Article 35." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 670A 
(Cum. Supp. 1957) (repealed 1977). 
33. 214 Md. 71, 133 A.2d 78 (1957). 
34. See Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209-10, 93 A.2d 280, 281-82 (1952); Baum v. 
State, 163 Md. 153, 161 A. 244, 245 (1932). But cf, United States v. Ramsey, 503 
F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974) (a family member or other regular user of a telephone 
may have standing at a minimization hearing). 
35. 220 Md. 159, 151 A.2d 737 (1959). 
36. Id. at 168, 151 A.2d at 741 (citing Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957». 
37. 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 
38. 220 Md. at 168-69, 151 A.2d at 741. 
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wiretapping statute's requirement of a prior court order. The court 
stressed that the statute required the consent of all participants,39 
basing its conclusion largely on the legislative history of the Act. 
Before passage into law, language in the bill requiring consent of "at 
least one of the participants" was amended to require consent of "the 
participants."4o 
In 1959 the General Assembly added sections 125A-C to Article 
27, making it 
unlawful for any person in this State to use any electronic 
device or equipment of any type whatsoever in such manner 
as to overhear or record any part of the conversation or 
words spoken to or by any person in private conversation 
without the knowledge or consent, express or implied, of that 
other person.41 
Thus, the scope of eavesdropping requiring a prior court order was 
expanded to encompass devices not commonly used in connection 
with telephone or telegraph lines. 
The procedures for obtaining a court order for use of an 
electronic eavesdropping device differed somewhat from those 
required for receiving permission to tap telephone or telegraph lines. 
Under section 125A(b), a law enforcement officer who found that a 
crime "[had] been or [was] being or [would] be committed"42 and that 
the use of the electronic device was "necessary" to prevent the crime 
or to apprehend the criminals, was required to submit evidence in 
support of his contention to a State's Attorney. Mter passing on the 
evidence presented, the State's Attorney was to apply to a circuit 
court judge or Baltimore City Supreme Bench judge for an order 
authorizing use of the device. Rather than having to show only that 
there were "no other means readily available for obtaining such 
information"43 as required for a wiretap order, the State's Attorney 
also had to demonstrate that use of the device was "necessary" to 
prevent commission of or to obtain evidence of the crime. Applying 
the rule of statutory construction that ordinary words will be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning, "necessary" has been defined as 
"that which cannot be dispensed with, essential, indispensable."44 
39. Id. at 171, 151 A.2d at 743 (emphasis added). 
40.Id. 
41. Electronic Surveillance Act, ch. 706, 1959 Md. Laws 1065 (emphasis added) 
(codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A (1976) (repealed 1977». 
42. Id. The Attorney General was not authorized to apply for an order under the 
electronic surveillance statute as he had been under the wiretapping statute. 
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 94(a)(3) (1971) (repealed and recodified 1973). 
44. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 980 (College ed. 1962). But see BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 1181 (4th ed. 1968): "This word must be considered in the 
transaction in which it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It 
may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that 
which is only convenient." 
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Showing that the use of a method of investigation is "indispensable" 
or "essential" is arguably more difficult than demonstrating that 
"there are no other means readily available,"45 because the latter 
suggests only that some degree of hardship would result from the use 
of other methods. While as a practical matter, the distinction 
between the two showings might not be significant, the requirement 
seems to have represented a l~gislative judgment that a stronger 
showing of n~ed should be made before the more intrusive electronic 
devices were used. 
The facts required on electronic surveillance applications 
likewise made obtaining a surveillance order more difficult than 
obtaining a wiretapping order. More specific than the corresponding 
provisions in the 1956 Wiretapping Act, the electronic surveillance 
statute required that 
[t]he affiant shall identify, with reasonable particularity, the 
device or devices to be used, the person or persons whose 
conversation is to be intercepted, the crime or crimes which 
are suspected to have been, or about to be committed, and 
that the evidence thus obtained will be used solely in 
connection with an investigation or prosecution of the said 
crimes before any such ex parte order shall be issued.46 
By contrast, the Wiretapping Act did not require identification of the 
persons whose conversation was to be intercepted, only identifica-
tion of the particular telephone or telegraph line which was to be 
tapped. 47 Strangely enough, the Electronic Surveillance Act did not 
provide for suppression of evidence obtained in violation of its 
provisions. Unlike the Maryland Wiretapping Act, the only statutory 
sanction for violation of the electronic surveillance law was the 
criminal misdemeanor penalty. 
In 1965, section 125D was added to Article 27,48 requiring 
persons possessing any electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping 
device to register that device with the superintendent of state police, 
including with the registration the name, address, identifying 
characteristics, and occupation of the possessor, an identifying 
description of each device possessed, and any further information 
the superintendent required.49 The provision made. it unlawful for 
any person to make any device unless it was registered before or 
immediately upon its completion. Registration was also required 
before any device could be transferred. 50 The equipment to be 
registered was broadly defined as 
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 94(a)(3) (1971) (repealed 1977). 
46. [d. art. 27, § 125A(b) (1976) (repealed 1977). 
47. [d. art. 35, § 94 (1971) (repealed and recodified 1973). 
48. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 201, 1965 Md. Laws 212 (repealed 1977). 
49. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125D(a) (1976) (repealed 1977). 
50. [d. § 125D(b). 
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every device, instrument, apparatus, or equipment, which is 
designed or especially re-designed to be adapted or actually 
adapted for the purpose of (1) secretly overhearing or 
reporting any part of the conversation or words spoken to or 
by any person in private conversation without the knowl-
edge or consent, express or implied, of that person, (2) 
intercepting or obtaining or attempting to obtain the whole 
or any part of a telephonic or telegraphic communication 
without the knowledge and consent of the participants 
thereto.51 
The registration provision was not directed to a law enforcement 
officer in the duly authorized performance of his duties.52 Also 
exempt from the registration requirement was a telephone or 
telegraph employee engaged in company business "while in the 
regular course of his employment."53 
C. Marylana Law After Title III 
Maryland wiretap and electronic surveillance law entered a new 
phase upon passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act in 1968.54 In State v. Siegel,55 the Maryland Court of 
Appeals considered whether the provisions of Title III were 
constitutional, and whether they were properly implemented by the 
existing provisions of the Maryland Code governing wiretapping 
and electronic surveillance. The court concluded that the federal 
statute complied with requirements set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Katz, Osborn, and Berger,56 noting that: 
[T]he federal act is not self-executing as applied to the states. 
Under § 2516(2), the principal prosecuting attorney of any 
state or political subdivision, if "authorized by a statute of 
that State," may apply "to a State court judge of competent 
jurisdiction for an order authorizing" the interception of 
wire or oral communication .... That section also states 
that the issuing judge may grant the order "in conformity 
with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable 
State statute."57 
Not only must the state have enacted its own statute before Title 
III can be effectuated, the Siegel court explained, but the state 
51. Id. 
52.Id. 
53. Id. Penalties for violation of § 125D were the same as penalties for violation of 
§ 125A·C, that is, a maximum of one year in prison, maximum $500 fine, or both. 
Id. § 125D(c). 
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970). 
55. 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972). 
56. See text accompanying notes 3-9 supra. 
57. 266 Md. at 271, 292 A.2d at 94. 
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statute cannot be less restrictive than the federal statute. The Siegel 
court emphasized the mandate in section 2515 that evidence 
obtained by the interception of communications in violation of Title 
III cannot be received into evidence in any court, federal or state. 
According to the Siegel court, "a state act which is more closely 
circumscribed than the federal law in granting eavesdrop authority 
is certainly permissible."58 
One of the more significant holdings of the Siegel court was that 
the federal Act required strict compliance. Title III "sets up a strict 
procedure that must be followed and we will not abide any deviation, 
no matter how slight, from the prescribed path."59 In Siegel, the 
magistrate "deviated" from the Act by not including in his order the 
required statements that the interceptions must begin "as soon as 
practicable," "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the 
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception 
under this chapter," and "must terminate upon attainment of the 
authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days."60 In dismissing 
the indictment, the court rejected the state's argument that 
"substantial compliance" with the Act was sufficient so long as the 
court scrutinized the manner in which the wiretap was carried out.61 
However, two years after Siegel was decided, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Giordan062 held that evidence derived from 
wiretapping must be suppressed under Title III only where there is 
"failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly 
and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the 
use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the 
employment of this extraordinary investigative device."63 
58. Id. at 272, 292 A.2d at 94 (citing Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 168-69, 151 A.2d 
737, 741 (1959}). 
59. Id. at 274, 292 A.2d at 95 (emphasis added). 
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5} (1970). 
61. Id.; accord, State v. Lee, 16 Md. App. 296, 295 A.2d 812 (1972). But see Everhart v. 
State, 274 Md. 459, 486-87, 337 A.2d 100, 116 (1974) (court held that, in view of 
recent Supreme Court decisions, the fact that evidence is tainted no longer gives 
defendant right to have indictment dismissed). 
62. 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (a Maryland case on appeal). 
63. Id. at 527 (emphasis added). The Court based its decision upon 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(1O}(a} (1970), which provided three instances in which the evidence is 
inadmissible: 
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it intercepted 
was insufficient on its face; or 
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval. 
The Court lended some credence to the government's argument that paragraph 
(i) does not cover statutory as well as constitutional violations. If such were the 
intent of Congress, the purely statutory violations of paragraphs (ii) and (iii) 
would be unnecessary -since they add nothing to the grounds for suppression 
already provided in paragraph (i). However, the Court read the words 
"unlawfully intercepted" in paragraph (i) as referring not only to interceptions 
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Although the Maryland Court of Appeals has not explicitly 
departed from its "strict compliance" standard in Siegel, cases after 
Giordano have limited strict compliance to those "precondition[s] to 
obtaining intercept authority ... central ... [to the] statutory 
scheme."64 In other words, only when the judge or officer fails to 
abide by the Act's requirements for the application and court order 
will strict compliance be required.65 Failure strictly to comply with 
the law during and after interception will not necessarily render the 
evidence obtained inadmissible. For example, in Spease v. State66 
the Maryland Court of Appeals held that "[ w ]here prejudice is not 
shown" or where "actual knowledge of the wiretap is evident,"67 
failure to serve the intercepted party with an inventory after 
interception precisely as set forth in the Act does not necessitate 
suppression of evidence. Emphasizing that the "opinion wasn't 
intended as a departure in any way from the holding in Siegel,"68 the 
court explained that the "fatal defect" in Siegel had been an 
essential "precondition" to obtaining authorization to intercept. 69 
During the regular 1973 session,70 an extensive revision of 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws was enacted by the 
made unconstitutionally, but to those made in violation of those requirements 
that "directly and substantially implement the congressional intention." 416 
U.S. at 527. 
64. See Spease v. State, 275 Md. 88, 108, 338 A.2d 284, 296 (1975); Calhoun v. State, 
34 Md. App. 365, 367 A.2d 40 (1977); Haina v. State, 30 Md. App. 295, 352 A.2d 
874 (1975). But see 30 VAND. L. REV. 98 (1977). This casenote examined the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 
1976), which held that despite a state statute disallowing interceptions and the 
admission of evidence derived from interceptions without exception, the federal" 
courts may allow evidence obtained in violation of the state statute to be 
admitted in a federal criminal trial, so long as the evidence is not obtained in 
violation of either the fourth amendment or Title III. 
65. See, e.g., Haina v. State, 30 Md. App. 295, 352 A.2d 874 (1976). 
66. 275 Md. 88, 338 A.2d 284 (1975). 
67. Id. at 105, 338 A.2d at 294. In Spease, one of the appellants received a copy of a 
search warrant with its underlying affidavit 12 days after the. wiretap's 
termination. He never received an "inventory," which under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(d) 
is to be sent not later than ninety days after termination of the period of an order 
or its extensions. The court also ruled that the circuit court did not err in refusing 
to suppress intercepted conversations of another appellant despite 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(9) which prohibits use of evidence of intercepted conversations against a 
party unless at least ten days prior to trial he has been furnished with a copy of 
the application and wiretap order. The appellant had actual notice of the wiretap 
almost six months before trial. 
68. Id. at 108 n.3, 338 A.2d at 295 n.3. 
69. The court of special appeals in Poore v. State, reiterated the Spease distinction 
between pre-order and post-order compliance standards: 
In the former, a defect will void the order and cause suppression of the 
evidence, but in the latter, a defect will not vitiate the order if there has 
been substantial compliance and no prejudice to the defendant is shown. 
Poore v. State, Daily Record, March 21, 1978 at 2, col. 1, 39 Md. App. 44, 53-54, 
384 A.2d 103, 110 (1978). 
70. During the state's 1973 Special Session, the Maryland General Assembly enacted 
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article which included the substance of 
Article 35. ~~ 92-99. Act of August 22. 1973, ch. 2, 1973 Md. Laws Spec. Sess. 4. 
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general assembly, but was later vetoed by Governor Mandel. 
Explaining his veto in a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Delegates,71 the governor stressed that proposed House Bill 962 
repealed by implication the portion of section 93 of Article 35, which 
prohibited wiretapping without the consent of all parties to the 
conversation. House Bill 962 would have allowed interception 
without consent of all parties under three circumstances: 1) by a 
person acting "under color of law" where such person was a party to 
the conversation; 2) by a person acting "under color of law" where 
one of the parties had given prior consent; or 3) by a person not act-
ting "under color of law" under the same restrictions, but with the 
additional limitation that such interception not be "for the purpose 
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the 
constitution, or federal or state law, or for the purpose of committing 
any other injurious act."72 
The governor expressed his concern that the new law would 
allow . .'. anyone . . . to intercept, listen in, and record the 
private conversations of people where only one party ... 
has given consent .... The other party ... is thus subject 
to having his conversation intercepted without his knowl-
edge [or] ... prior court approval, and without any need to 
show probable cause to believe that criminal activity of any 
kind may be afoot. The very opportunity for unwarranted 
spying and intrusions on people's privacy authorized by this 
bill is frightening; and recent revelations have given clear 
indication that the possibilities of abuse are more real than 
theoretical. 73 
An equally concerned legislature established an investigating 
committee in 1975 to examine allegations that state police were 
conducting illegal surveillance of citizens.74 The dual purpose of the 
investigation was to uncover any unwarranted information-
gathering activities and to make recommendations to the next 
session of the general assembly for legislation permanently to 
correct the abuses found. 75 
71. 1973 Md. Laws 1924. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 1924-25. While House Bill 962 was defeated, the language which the 
governor had so vehemently opposed is the language which was adopted by the 
1977 Act. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § lo-402(c)(2), (3) (Supp. 1977). 
74. A Baltimore City grand jury began an investigation in the fall of 1974 of alleged 
police surveillance of citizens not suspected of criminal activity. Although the 
grand jury was not able to complete its investigation before the term expired, it 
submitted a report on January 10, 1975, recommending that the investigation be 
continued by the incoming grand jury. REPORT TO THE SENATE OF MARYLAND BY 
THE SENATE INVESTIGATING COMM. ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SENATE 
RESOLUTIONS 1 AND 151 OF THE 1975 MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE REPORTS]. 
75. [d. 
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One significant area of police surveillance investigated by the 
senate committee was wiretapping. Sworn testimony and affidavits 
from former police officers revealed that the Baltimore Police 
Department from the ,mid-1960's until 1973 used Chesapeake and 
Potomac Telephone Company employees to monitor particular 
telephone lines without court order. By virtue of this unauthorized 
monitoring, the police were able to obtain a telephone subscriber's 
name and address and other information relating to illegal 
activities. In tum, this data was used to prepare affidavits for search 
warrant applications. 
As a result of their study, the committee recommended that a 
comprehensive state act be passed, patterned along the lines of Title 
III. The committee observed that the "current laws ... regulating 
[wiretapping and electronic surveillanceJ are inadequate both in 
substance and in form and lack necessary specificity in such critical 
areas as wiretapping. These laws are located in various sections 
throughout" the Maryland Code and many are all but obsolete in 
view of Maryland case law construing them and federal enact-
ments."76 
III. THE 1977 MARYLAND WIRETAPPING AND 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACT 
A. Pre-Interception Provisions 
In enacting Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil-
lance Act, the general assembly adopted substantially all of the 
language in Title III. One major difference between the two acts is 
the definition of the type of communication which would require a 
judicial order before interception. The federal statute defines "oral 
communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to 
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation."77 By 
contrast, the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act 
defines "oral communication" as "any conversation or words spoken 
to or by any person in private conversation."78 
The "justifiable expectation of privacy" reasoning adopted by 
the federal law originated in Katz v. United States. 79 According to 
76. [d. at 67, The Senate Report made several specific recommendations for reform 
which will be noted when the relevant provisions are discussed, 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1970). See generally Note, The Reasonable Expectation, of 
Privacy - Katz v. United States, A Postscription, IND. L. REv. 468 (1976). 
78. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(2) (Supp. 1977). This definition is 
derived from the former Article 27, § 125A provision which made it "unlawful for 
any person , . , to overhear or record any part of the conversation or words 
spoken to or by any person in private conversation without the knowledge or 
consent, express or implied, of that other person." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125A 
(1976) (repealed 1977) (emphasis added). 
79. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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the Katz court, when a person closes the doors of a telephone booth, 
he may justifiably rely upon the privacy of his conversation.so In 
Hoffa v. United States,8! the Court stated that such reliance is not 
justified where a "wrongdoer" mistakenly believes "that a person to 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it,"82 
nor can the defendant justifiably expect privacy upon confiding to a 
government agent who records the conversation electronically 
without the defendant's knowledge.83 
The refusal of the Maryland legislature to incorporate the 
federal definition of "oral communication" into the Maryland Act 
may indicate either an intent to impose stricter standards or to 
clarify the existing federal provision. In United States v. Curreri,84 
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
commented that a state wiretapping and electronic surveillance law 
may be stricter than Title III, but may not fall below minimum 
federal standards.85 
While the 1977 Maryland Act has adopted the federal consen-
sual/participant monitoring allowed in Hoffa and Lopez, it has 
somewhat restricted the scope of participant monitoring.86 Before the 
new wiretapping and electronic surveillance law, the state status of 
participant monitoring was uncertain. The Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals in Pennington v. State87 remarked that the 
Maryland wiretapping statute "does not prohibit participant 
monitoring,"88 but reserved the question of whether the state's 
electronic surveillance statute similarly allowed such monitoring. 
Despite this prIor disparity in treatment of participant monitor-
ing between Maryland's wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
laws, the legislature has now left no doubt that a person's 
conversation may be intercepted under certain conditions without a 
court order and without his permission.89 Section 10-402(c)(2) of the 
1977 Act allows "an investigative or law enforcement officer ... to 
intercept a wire or oral communication in order to provide evidence 
of the commission of [certain enumerated offenses] where the person 
is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent to the interception."90 
Section 2511(2)(c), the comparable provision in the federal 
wiretap statute, states that "it shall not be unlawful ... for a person 
80. [d. at 352. 
81. 375 U.S. 293 (1966). 
82. [d. at 302. 
83. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963). 
84. 358 F. Supp. 607 (D. Md. 1974). 
85. [d. at 613. 
86. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(2) (Supp. 1977). 
87. 19 Md. App. 253, 310 A.2d 817 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974). 
88. [d. at 277 n.13, 310 A.2d at 830 n.13. 
89. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402 (Supp. 1977). 
90. [d. § 10-402(c)(2) (emphasis added) .. 
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acting under color of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, 
where such person is a party to the communication or one of the 
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such 
interception."91 Rather than using the possibly ambiguous terminol-
ogy "person acting under color of law," the new Maryland statute 
clearly delineates those persons who may intercept under such 
circumstances, limiting the scope of such interceptions to the 
enumerated felonies in section 10-402(c)(2). 
Under the Maryland Act, only "an investigative or law 
enforcement officer" may intercept a conversation upon the consent 
of only one party.92 Under the federal statute, anyone may intercept 
a conversation, provided: 
(1) the "person is a party to the communication [;] or 
[(2)] one of the parties ... has given prior consent to 
such interception."93 
The interception may not be for the purpose of committing tortious 
or criminal acts, however. In Maryland, such an interception may be 
undertaken by a person who is not a law enforcement officer only if: 
(1) the "person is a party to the communication and [;] 
[(2)] all of the parties ... have given prior consent."94 
By making both participation and consent mandatory, the Mary-
land law has imposed stricter requirements for civilian monitoring 
than has Title III. 
Monitoring is further restricted in Maryland "to provide 
evidence of the commission of the offenses of murder, kidnapping, 
gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in controlled 
dangerous substances, or any conspiracy to commit any of these 
offenses."95 The federal Act's list of crimes for which surveillance 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 251l(2)(c) (1970) (emphasis added). 
92. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(2) (Supp. 1977). 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 251l(2)(d) (1970) (emphasis added). 
94. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c)(3) (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). 
Maryland has also incorporated the federal stipulation that the interception not 
be to further a criminal or tortious act. [d. 
95. MD. CT. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977). House Bill 475, enacted 
during the 1978 Legislative Session, adds arson to the list of crimes which may 
be grounds for interception within the state. House Bill 475 was signed into law 
on May 2,1978. Law of May 2,1978, ch. 339,1978 Md. Laws __ Another bill 
was introduced which would have included larceny and receiving stolen goods 
among the Act's enumerated offenses. H.B. 701 (1978) (filed Jan. 13, 1978, 
unfavorably reported March 15, 1978). 
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can be conducted is considerably broader.96 While Maryland 
rightfully could have added to its enumerated offenses any crime 
"dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable . . . for more 
than one year,"97 the general assembly narrowed the list of 
interceptable offenses. 
Less discretion is allowed under Maryland law than under Title 
III in the performance of certain procedures by the issuing judge. For 
example, where the federal Act states that a court order "may" 
require periodic progress reports to be made to the judge,98 the 
Maryland Act states that all interception orders "shall" require 
progress reports.99 Similarly, section 1D-408(g)(4) mandates that the 
judge make available to the persons named in the orderloo portions of 
the intercepted communications, applications, and orders pertaining 
to that person and the alleged crime. IOl On the other hand, Title III 
leaves to the judge's discretion whether in the "interest of justice" 
inspection of the intercepted communications and other materials is 
needed.102 
In Maryland, only a "judge of competent jurisdiction"lo3·can 
authorize an interception under specified conditions. The new 
Maryland statute defines a "judge of competent jurisdiction" as a 
"circuit court [judge] or [a judge of] the Supreme Bench of Baltimore 
City."!04 Section 10-403 of the previous Maryland wiretapping law, 
however, included district court judges among those authorized to 
issue orders.105 The district court judges are omitted from the new 
law, since interceptions may be authorized only in cases where they 
will reveal evidence of particular felonies that lie outside district 
court jurisdiction. lo6 The previous Maryland statute addressed itself 
to "crimes" rather than to specific, enumerated felonies. 107 
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c) (1970) (e.g., bankruptcy fraud and obstruction of criminal 
investigation are included). 
97. Id. § 2518(d) (1970). See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.460 (1973). 
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970). 
99. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(f) (Supp. 1977). 
100. Other parties to intercepted communications may also be included within the 
judge's discretion. Id. at § 10-408(g)(4). 
101. Id. 
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970). 
103. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977). 
104. Id. § 10-401(8). 
105. Id. § 10-403(a) (1974) (repealed 1977). See Adkings, Code Revision in Maryland: 
The Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 34 MD. L. REV. 7 (1974) (notes that 
former Article 26, § 145(b)(6) was written into § 10-403, despite apparent conflict 
with federal law which, according to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9)(b), allowed authorization 
only by judges of courts of "general criminal jurisdiction of a State"). 
106. The district court presently has criminal jurisdiction in the case of misdemeanors 
and certain other crimes: false pretenses, larceny, larceny after trust, receiving 
stolen goods, and shoplifting, which may be felonies or misdemeanors. MD. CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. ~ 4-301 (1974). 
107. See id. § 10-403(a)(I)-(2) (1974) (repealed 1977). 
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B. Treatment of Violations Under the 1977 Maryland Act 
The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act 
provides maximum criminal penalties of five years imprisonment or 
a fine of $10,000 or both for the person who "manufactures, 
assembles, possesses, or sells any electronic, mechanical or other 
device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of the 
device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious 
interception of wire or oral communications."108 Under the federal 
Act, manufacture or sale is a felony only if the person had reason to 
know that such a device or its components has circulated or is about 
to circulate through the mail or in interstate or foreign commerce.109 
The practical effect of the changed Maryland law, however, may be 
relatively insignificant. It is doubtful that violations under the Act 
will involve devices completely unconnected with interstate com-
merce, especially considering the numerous components which 
comprise most wiretapping devices' and the likelihood that at least 
one of those components has been manufactured outside the state. 
Thus, a violator of the federal Act would generally violate the 
Maryland Act as well. The new section 10-403 merely increases the 
chances of prosecution for these violations by providing a state 
forum in addition to the forum already existing in the federal courts. 
A more significant difference between the two acts can be found 
in Maryland's omission of the federal prohibition against advertis-
ing for wiretapping/bugging devices. It would seem incongruous to 
impose a $10,000 fine for the sale of such devices, yet freely to allow 
advertisement of devices within the state by the very persons 
prohibited from selling them. One logical explanation for the 
Maryland omission is that it was purely an oversight on the part of 
the legislature. lIo 
Both the Maryland and federal Acts create an exception to the 
manufacturing prohibition for an officer, agent, or employee of 
federal, state, or local government who manufactures, assembles, 
possesses, or sells devices in the normal course of his lawful 
activities. IlI Maryland's section 10-403(b)(3) and (4), however, 
contains the additional qualification that "any sale made under the 
authority of [these] paragraph[s] may only be for the purpose of 
disposing of obsolete or surplus devices."1l2 Officers, agents, or 
108. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-403(a) (Supp. 1977). The change was 
recommended by the Senate Investigating Committee. 1975 SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 74, at 68. 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1970). 
110. Among those jurisdictions prohibiting the sale and manufacture of devices, none 
has seen fit to remove the advertising prohibition. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-9-309 (1973); D.C. CODE § 23-543 (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 934.04 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. ~ 626A.03 (Cum. Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §570-A:3 (1974); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §2A:156A-5 (1971). 
111. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2512(2)(b) (1970) with MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§ 10-403(b)(3), (4) (Supp. 1977). 
112. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-403(b)(3) (Supp. 1977). 
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employees of a Maryland law enforcement agency or political 
subdivision of Maryland are limited further to manufacturing, 
assembling, possessing, or selling such devices only if "the 
particular officer, agent, or employee is specifically authorized by the 
chief administrator of the employer law enforcement agency" to 
further "a particular law enforcement purpose."1l3 
Under section 10-411 of the Maryland Act, law enforcement 
agencies are now required to register all interception devices in their 
control with the Maryland Department of Public Safety and 
Correctional Services within ten days of obtaining control or 
possession of the devices.1l4 While the registration requirement has 
been in existence since 1965, the previous Maryland law imposed no 
time limit in which the devices were to be registered.ll5 Apparently, 
Maryland is the only jurisdiction to incorporate a registration 
provision in its electronic surveillance law.1l6 
Maryland's new penalty provision117 is not quite so unique to the 
state. Borrowed from the corresponding provision in Title III,118 
section 10-402(b) makes interception or disclosure of communica-
tions obtained in violation of the Act punishable by a possible 
$10,000 fine and five-year imprisonment, or both.1l9 Before the recent 
Act, violation of Maryland's wiretapping law was only a misdemea-
nor with a maximum $1,000 fine or 90-day imprisonment or both.120 
Making violation of the new law a felony also extends the limitation 
period in which the state may prosecute beyond the one-year limit 
set for all misdemeanors.l21 The change represents a legislative 
judgment that the protection of individual privacy is worth 
reinforcing with stringent penalties. 
Section 10-410 of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Act further expands the protection afforded private 
parties. Until the 1977 enactment, Maryland provided the subject of 
an interception conducted in contravention of Maryland law no civil 
remedy for the invasion of his privacy. Like the federal Act, 
Maryland law now grants the injured party the right to sue "any 
person who intercepts, discloses; or uses, or procures any other 
113. Id. § 10-403(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
114. Id. § 10-411. The SenatEl Investigating Committee recommended that devices 
should be registered within ten days of their receipt. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 74 at 70. 
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125D (1976) (repealed 1977). 
116. As of February, 1978, no other jurisdiction had enacted a similar registration 
requirement. 
117. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(b) (Supp. 1977). 
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(I)(d) (1970). 
119. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(b) (Supp. 1977). 
120. Id. § 10-408 (1974) (repealed 1977). Penalties for violation of the Maryland 
electronic surveillance statute were a maximum fine of $500 or imprisonment of 
up to one year, or both in the court's discretion. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 125B 
(1976) (repealed 1977). 
121. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-106(a) (1974). 
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person to intercept, disclose, or use the communications" obtained in 
violation of the subsection.122 The plaintiff in such an action may 
recover actual damages "computed at the rate of $100 a day for each 
day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher,"123 in addition to 
punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees and "other litigation 
costs reasonably incurred."124 
Litigants who might have been discouraged from bringing suit 
in federal court by the inconvenience of travelling to Baltimore from 
distant parts of the state may now sue in their local circuit courts 
under the new Maryland law. Others who would not have had 
standing to sue in federal court for failure to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional "amount in controversy"125 are provided a forum in which to 
allege wiretapping or electronic surveillance violations.126 
When the subject of surveillance conducted in violation of the 
Act is charged with a crime based on the evidence seized, the 
Maryland Act differs from Title III in the permissible grounds for 
suppression of that evidence. Under the federal Act, evidence may be 
suppressed if "the order of authorization or approval under which it 
was intercepted is insufficient on its face."127 The Maryland Act 
adds the words "or was not obtained or issued in strict compliance 
with this subtitle,"128 reflecting the Spease holding that suppression 
is proper only where "preconditions" to wiretapping are violated.129 
The Maryland Act would appear to lay down more exacting 
procedural requirements than Title III. As interpreted by federal 
case law,130 however, Title III demands the same strict compliance to 
surveillance "preconditions" that is expressed by the Maryland law. 
122. Id. § 10-41O(a) (Supp. 1977). 
123. Id. § 10-41O(a)(1). 
124. Id. § 10-41O(a)(2), (3). 
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (requiring $10,000 damages to be alleged). 
126. It should be noted, however, that the 1976 amendment to § 1331 removed the 
jurisdictional amount in suits brought against the United States, one of its 
employees, or an officer or an employee acting within the scope of his office. 
Since most, if not all, civil suits would be brought against "law enforcement 
officers," the benefit of having a state forum is somewhat lessened. Under 
Maryland law, as in the federal statute at 18 U.S.C. § 2520, a "good faith reliance 
on a court order" shall constitute a complete 'defense to any civil or criminal 
action brought. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-41O(3)(b) (Supp. 1977). 
Under the federal statute, reliance upon § 2518(7) is also a defense. That section 
allows interceptions to be made without prior judicial authorization when 
grounds exist for an order with regard to conspiratorial actions of organized 
crime or threats to the national security when an interception must be made 
before an order may be obtained. Maryland has not adopted enabling legislation 
for such interceptions, although § 2518(7) allows the interceptions to be made by 
"the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting 
pursuant to a statute of that State." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1970). 
127. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1O)(a)(ii) (1970). 
128. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(h)(i)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1977). 
129. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra. 
130. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.s. 562 (1974); United States v. Giordano, 416 
U.S. 505 (1974). 
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One final variation between the two acts is the addition of a 
state prohibition against breaking, entering, or trespassing with 
intent to plant or remove electronic surveillance devices. 131 Such 
actions would not necessarily be crimes under Maryland's existing 
trespass or breaking and entering laws.l32 
C. Possible Problem Areas in the Act 
Despite the numerous advantages of the Maryland Wiretapping 
and Electronic Surveillance Act, the law poses some distinct 
interpretational problems, particularly where it has departed from 
the language of Title III. Nowhere is this problem more evident than 
in the substitution of "private conversation" for "justifiable 
expectation" to describe what oral communications may not be 
intercepted without court order.133 Maryland is one of only two states 
to have incorporated this definition of oral communication into its 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance law.134 State precedent 
interpreting the meaning of "private conversation" within the 
context of Maryland's prior wiretapping law is scanty.135 Decisions 
from other jurisdictions are likewise meager. 
Before 1973, Washington had made no attempt to clarify the 
meaning of "private conversation" in its wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance law. Stating that the words should be construed "to best 
fulfill the purpose of the statute,"136 a Washington court noted that 
"the phrase 'private conversation' is all embracing .... To construe 
the words 'private conversation' narrowly and grudgingly would 
unnecessarily fail to give full effect to the legislative purpose to 
protect the freedom of people to hold conversations intended only for 
131. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-412 (Supp. 1977). 
132. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 30,32,576-5778 (1976). To be an illegal trespass 
under Article 27, §§ 576-5778, the property owner must have either posted his 
property, notified the trespasser not to enter the property, or the trespasser must 
have refused to leave a public building or certain other public property. Even if a 
violation of §§ 576-5778 were found, the maximum fine of $1,000 for the trespass 
fails to approach the $10,000 figure imposed by the Maryland wiretapping and 
electronic surveillance law. 
Since violation of the wiretapping and electronic surveillance ll:!.w is now a 
felony, the violator may also be guilty of violating Article 27, § 30 or § 32, which 
penalizes those who break into dwellings at night with the intent to commit a 
felony. While .neither § 30 nor § 32 of Article 27 carries fines for breaking and 
entering offenses, the possible prison sentence for their violation is ten years in 
the state penitentiary. 
133. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-401(2) (Supp. 1977). 
134. The Washington statute also makes it unlawful to "intercept, record, or divulge 
any ... [p]rivate conversation." See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.73.030 (1977). 
135. The court in Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972), however, used 
the justifiable expectation test to determine if it was a violation of the fourth 
amendment to film a criminal act in progress. The court failed to state whether 
the same test would similarly apply to "private conversations" within the 
Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. 
136. State v. Grant, 9 Wash. App. 260, 265, 511 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1973). 
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the ears of the participant."137 While the Washington interpretation 
of "private conversation" is persuasive authority in the Maryland 
courts, it should be noted that Washington, unlike Maryland, still 
requires the consent of all parties to a conversation before 
interception will be allowed.138 The recent removal of the all-party 
consent requirement for police-conducted surveillance from the 
Maryland law casts some doubt on whether the Maryland courts will 
be able to attribute to the phrase "private conversation" the same 
broad construction given it by Washington's state courts. 
How Maryland courts will interpret the legislature's decision to 
eliminate from the Act prior prohibitions against the advertising of 
electronic devices is equally doubtful.139 While clearly a less 
egregious offense than manufacturing, distributing, or selling 
devices, allowing advertising does not serve to encourage the Act's 
purpose of limiting the number and type of persons to whom devices 
will be made available. 
Another minor difference between the Maryland and federal Acts 
has the potential for causing some confusion. Under Title III, the 
"Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially 
designated ... may authorize an application to a Federal judge of 
competent jurisdiction."14o The corresponding provision in the 
Maryland statute states that the "Attorney General or any State's 
Attorney may apply to a judge of competent jurisdiction"141 for a 
court order. The Maryland law then requires that each application 
include "[t]he identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer 
making the application, and the officer authorizing the applica-
tion."142 On the strength of section 1O-408(a)(1), a "law enforcement 
officer" may apply directly to a judge for a court order, even though 
the earlier provision in the act allowed only the attorney general or 
137. Id. The Grant court held that conversations between the defendant und his 
attorney and between the defendant and a police detective were "private 
conversations" within the meaning of the Washington Act, where conducted at 
the police station without knowledge of interception and without consent of both 
parties. See also State v. Smith, 85 Wash. 2d 840, 540 P.2d 424 (1975), where the 
court held that a tape recording made by a murder victim which recorded 
screams, shouts, and gun shots did not fall within the definition of "private 
conversation." 
138. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-402(c) (Supp. 1977) with WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (1977). In Maryland, the consent of all parties is 
needed only when interception is not under the direction of a law enforcement 
officer. 
139. The 1974 ABA Standards Report on Electronic Surveillance recommended that 
advertising be prohibited in Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 
Act. THE JOINT COMMITTEES OF MARYLAND JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AND 
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, To IMPLEMENT THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 585C(b) (1974) [hereinafter 
cited as ABA STANDARDS REPORT). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970) (emphasis added). 
141. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-406 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). 
142. Id. § 1O-408(a)(I) (emphasis added). 
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the state's attorney to make such an application.143 The apparent 
inconsistency between the two provisions should be resolved for the 
purpose of clarity. 
IV. PROVISIONS NOT INCLUDED IN THE MARYLAND ACT 
In its 1974 Report on ABA Standards on Electronic Surveil-
lance,144 joint committees of the Maryland Judicial Conference and 
the Maryland Bar Association made a series of recommendations for 
changes to the Maryland wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
law. Among the joint committee suggestions not adopted by the 
Maryland legislature145 is one particularly worthy of note. 
In recognition of the sensitive and legally privileged nature of 
certain communications, the committee proposed that the intercep-
tion of communications in places "primarily used" by practicing, 
licensed physicians, attorneys, and clergymen be prohibited unless 
"special need" is shown.14s Some jurisdictions have already enacted 
electronic surveillance laws which incorporate similar protective 
language.147 In the interest of minimizing unnecessary interception, 
other jurisdictions have imposed a "special need" requirement 
whenever the law enforcement officer anticipates that public 
facilities will be tapped.148 
143. As a practical matter, "officer" will likely be interpreted to mean attorney 
general or state's attorney rather than "law enforcement officer." Ct. United 
States v. Giordano .. 416 U.S. 505, 520 (1974) ("The authority to apply for court 
orders is to be narrowly confined ... to those responsive to the political 
process."). Accord, Poore v. State, Daily Record, March 21, 1978, at 1, col. 1,39 
Md. App. 44, 384 A.2d 103 (1978). 
144. ABA STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 140. 
145. The Maryland legislature did not adopt the following major recommendations 
made in the ABA Standards Report: 
(1) To follow the federal definition of "oral communications"; 
(2) To include in the definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer" 
United States as well as state officials; 
(3) To disallow interception where not all parties consent, even where acting 
under police direction; 
(4) To prohibit advertising of electronic devices in any newspaper, magazine, 
handbill or other publication; 
(5) To add to the crimes for which wiretapping could be conducted (a) arson (b) 
maliciously burning certain property, (c) attempting to bum certain 
property, (d) breaking and entering with intent to steal, (e) rape, (1) 
carnal knowledge of a child under 14 years of age or an insane or 
incompetent woman. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§6-1O, 29,30,32,461, 
462 (1976 and Supp. 1977); 
(6) To allow the applicant for a court order to base his application on 
"information and belief," supported by affidavits of law enforcement 
officers oiothers having knowledge of the facts; 
(7) To add grounds for suppression where "the order was based on an affidavit 
or material known by the applicant to be materially false." 
146. ABA STANDARDS REPORT, supra note 140, § 585H(5). 
147. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41h (West Cum. Supp. 1978); R.1. GEN. LAws 
§ 12-5.1 (Supp. 1977). 
148. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-41d(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J. REV. 
STAT. §2A:156A-ll (Cum. Supp. 1977); R.1. GEN. LAws §12-5.1, 1-4(b) (Supp. 
1977). 
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While there now exists a provision in Maryland against 
admission of evidence derived from the interception of a privileged 
communication,149 it would be a greater safeguard to prevent 
privileged communications from being intercepted unless absolutely 
necessary.l50 However, the use of the vague language "special need" 
does not clarify for either law enforcement officers or the judiciary 
exactly what must be shown in addition to the Act's already strong 
requirements. 
Section 10-403 now mandates that the application include "[a] 
full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative 
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear 
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."151 It is 
difficult to conceive of a stronger showing of need that could be 
made by a law enforcement officer, with the exception of showing 
that he has actually tried all other available procedures before 
requesting a wiretap or bug.l52 Yet, without resorting to the use of 
"special need," a provision could be fashioned which would further 
protect privileged communications from unwarranted ihterception. 
The provision could require that the applicant demonstrate a belief 
that the attorney, physician or clergyman whose telephones, office 
or home are to be tapped or bugged is, himself, suspected of one of 
the Act's enumerated offenses. In the case of the attorney, an 
interception could also be allowed upon showing that there is reason 
to believe the attorney is concealing information on the proposed 
criminal acts of a client, in direct violation of the American Bar 
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.153 
In seeking conformity with Title III, the Maryland General 
Assembly may have failed to consider seriously provisions in other 
jurisdictions' wiretapping and electronic surveillance laws which 
either supplement or clarify language in the federal Act. Many of 
these provisions might be beneficial additions to the Maryland 
149. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE Arm. § 1D-407(d) (Supp. 1977). Section 1D-407(d) 
provides that "[a]n otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted 
in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this subtitle, does not lose 
its privileged character." 
150. A privileged conversation may now be excJuded from interception where the 
monitor conducts "spot checking" of the conversation being recorded. In reality, 
" 'most agents have been reluctant to unplug their earphones for fear that they 
will miss an important conversation.' " Poore v. State, Daily Record, March 21, 
1978, at 2 col. 5, 39 Md. App. 44, 70, 384 A.2d 103, 118 (1978) (quoting Low, Post-
Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps: Minimization, Amendment, 
Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORN. L. REV. 92, 96 (1975». Consequently, limiting 
inteceptions of communications conducted on attorney's, physican's and 
clergymen's phones may be the only means for truly minimizing intrusions into 
privileged conversations. 
151. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1D-408(a)(3) (Supp. 1977). 
152. See Trovinger v. State, 34 Md. App. 357, 361, 367 A.2d 548, 551 (1977), where the 
court held that "[tJhe state need not exhaust all conceivable investigative 
possibilities before seeking a wiretap." 
153. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 7-102(A)(3) (1976). 
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statute. For example, Connecticut requires that the application for a 
court order state that the person who will be conducting the wiretap 
or electronic surveillance be qualified to do so by training and 
experience.154 Such a provision serves to implement the Act's policy 
that wiretaps should be conducted carefully so as to reduce the 
chance that unnecessary or excessive intrusions into privacy will 
occur.155 Also minimizing unnecessary intrusions are the Connecti-
cut and Massachusetts provisions which require the applicant to 
demonstrate that secret entry to install a device is necessary, if such 
installation is to be made.156 
A few jurisdictions that substantially have adopted Title III 
impose upon telephone and telegraph companies the duty to report to 
the police department or state's attorney any violations of the 
surveillance law of which they may be aware.157 While Maryland 
imposes no equivalent reporting duty, the state does require 
"communication common carrier[s], landlord[s] ... or other per-
son[s]" to furnish law enforcement officers with "all information, 
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the 
interception unobtrusively."158 To require the reporting of unautho-
rized tapping by those facilities most likely to discover such 
interceptions would be in keeping with the statute's expressed intent 
to encourage cooperation of third parties in the effective enforcement 
of the Maryland law. 
According to some states, wiretapping laws should not be so 
stringently enforced where the need to make routine recordings of 
conversations for purely legitimate purposes would make obtaining 
a court order unduly burdensome.159 Massachusetts carves out an 
exception to the requirement for a court order in addition to those 
already created under Title III of the federal statute. I60 When an 
"intercommunication system" is used in the "ordinary course of ... 
business," Massachusetts does not make it unlawful for that 
business to intercept intercommunications without the supervision 
of a law enforcement officer.161 The major difficulty with this 
154. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-41d(8) (Supp. 1978). 
155. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-408(e) (1977), which provides 
that "[e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the 
authorization to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize 
the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception." See 
generally Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §54-41c(10) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West Supp. 1974) (must be "reasonably" necessary). 
157. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §626A.15 (Cum. Supp. 1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-105 
(Supp. 1977), § 13-3009 (Special Pamphlet 1977, effective Oct. 1, 1978). 
158. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1O-408(d)(2) (Supp. 1977). 
159. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §99 (Supp. 1974). 
160. [d. Title III exempts switchboard operators and telephone and telegraph 
employees citing in the "normal course" of their employment, as well as law 
enforcement officers and those persons acting under their direction in conducting 
participant monitoring. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). 
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1974). 
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exception is interpreting the precise meaning of "intercommunica-
tion system." Without substantially narrowing the type of equip-
ment falling within th~ definition of "intercommunication system," 
the exception could be abused easily. Less likely to be abused is the 
Florida provision that makes the tapping of telephones to trace 
obscene, harassing, or threatening telephone calls an exception to 
the court order requirement.162 In Colorado, an exception is provided 
for news agencies and their employees where "reasonable notice of 
use"163 is given to the public. 
One of the more controversial provisions to be drafted into a 
state surveillance law is the Virginia requirement that the judge who 
considers the application for an order disqualify himself from trying 
the case based on evidence obtained in the interception.164 The 
controversiality of the provision may explain why Virginia is thus 
far the only state to have mandated judicial disqualification.165 Not 
only does such a provision question the independence and fairness of 
the judiciary, but it can pose some practical problems as well. In 
those Maryland circuits where judges are separated by as much as 
twenty or thirty miles from one another, disqualification can result 
in geographical inconvenience and administrative delay. 
The American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct does 
not expressly forbid a judge from trying a case based on his earlier 
ex parte orders.166 Nevertheless, the Code states that 
a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including 
but not limited to instances where . . . he has. . . personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding .167 
162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). It should be noted, however, that 
this exception may already be covered under the provision making it lawful for a 
"communication common carrier" who "in the normal course of ... employ-
ment" intercepts oral communications "while engaged in any activity which is a 
necessary incident to the rendition of ... service." See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § lo-402(c)(1)(i) (Supp. 1977). Because it is unclear whether tracing 
such calls is "incident to the rendition of service," the Maryland legislature 
. might be advised to expressly provide for such interceptions by telephone 
companies. 
163. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-305(1) (1973) states, in part, that "nothing ... 
shall ... prevent a news agency, or an employee thereof, from using the 
accepted tools and equipment of that news medium in the course of reporting or 
investigating a public and newsworthy event." 
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-68(b) (Supp. 1977). The Virginia law provides: "The judge 
who considers an application for an interception under this chapter, whether 
issuing or denying the order, shall be disqualified from presiding at any trial 
resulting from or in any manner connected with such interception, regardless of 
whether the evidence acquired thereby is used in such trial. HId. (emphasis 
added). 
165. As of February, 1978. 
166. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1975). 
167. Id. Canon 3C.(1) and 3C.(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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The Code also strongly cautions against consideration by the judge 
of ex parte communications concerning impending proceedings, 
"except as authorized by law."168 Naturally, the ex parte nature of a 
surveillance order can work to the detriment of the absent party, the 
potential criminal defendant. To counteract this detrimental effect, 
the issuing judge should evaluate carefully the application to 
determine the existence of probable cause. Careful scrutiny, however, 
may not be sufficient to adequately safeguard the interests of the 
party whose conversations are to be intercepted. Should the same 
judge later be called upon to reexamine the propriety of his order and 
the probable cause determination upon which it was based, his 
impartiality and ability to invalidate the order "might reasonably be 
questioned."169 No doubt, a concern with maintaining high stand-
ards of judicial ethics and with counteracting the potential adverse 
effects of the ex parte order were partly responsible for the Virginia 
legislature's enactment of a judicial disqualification provision. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act is a 
marked improvement over the earlier Maryland statutes in several 
notable respects. Not only does the Act increase the punishment for 
violation of its provisions, it provides a previously unavailable civil 
damage remedy. The. Act further allows for suppression of evidence 
seized in violation of the statute, a procedure which did not exist 
under the former Electronic Surveillance Act. Unlike the prior law, 
the Act penalizes the breaking and entering of premises to plant a 
wiretapping or electronic surveillance device, and creates a ten-day 
period in which all devices must be registered. Undoubtedly, the 
most significant and controversial change from earlier Maryland 
law is the provision which now permits wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance without the unanimous consent of all the participants to 
the communication. 
While the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 
Act closely follows Title III, it imposes certain procedural require-
ments which are stricter than the corresponding requirements in the 
federal Act. The definition of "oral communications" for which 
court-ordered interception is required has conceivably been broad-
ened by a departure from the objective federal "justifiable expecta-
tion" test. In espousing the participant monitoring permitted by 
federal law, Maryland has limited the types of offenses for which 
such monitoring is allowed. When an interception is not conducted 
by a law enforcement official, the Act requires that the person 
intercepting the communications be a party to that communication 
and that the other parties consent to the interception. Title III allows 
168. ld. Canon 3A.(4). 
169. ld. Canon 3C.(I)(a). 
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civilian monitoring when there is either unanimous consent or 
participation by the intercepting party. 
The judge authorizing a Maryland surveillance must demand 
periodic progress reports during the interception and must provide 
the subject of surveillance with "portions of the intercepted 
communication" upon request after completion of the interception. It 
is solely within the discretion of the federal judge whether either of 
these actions are to be performed. 
Facially stricter than the federal statute, the Maryland Act 
provides essentially the same grounds for suppression of evidence as 
Title III. Less strict than the federal provision is Maryland's failure 
to prohibit the advertising of electronic devices. 
Improvement though it may be, the Maryland Act contains 
several provisions which call for clarification by the legislature and 
lacks other provisions which could demonstrably add to the force 
and purpose of the Act. Where intrusion into constitutionally 
protected rights is made permissible by statute, that statute should 
periodically be re-examined to determine its continuing validity and 
effecti veness. 
Marianne B. Davis 
Laurie R. Bortz 
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APPENDIX 
Section 10-409(c) of Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Act requires a report to be submitted by the state court 
administrator to the general assembly each February concerning 
"the number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the 
interception of wire or oral communications and the number of 
orders and extensions granted or denied during the preceding 
calendar year."! The 1978 report made pursuant to section lo-409(c) 
reflects wiretapping and electronic surveillance activities conducted 
over the six-month period from July through December, 1977,2 as 
reported by ten of the state's twenty-four political subdivisions.3 
As summarized in the report, four of the ten subdivisions 
indicated no activity,4 whereas Prince George's County, Baltimore 
City, Harford County and Montgomery County, in that order, 
reported the most activity. None of the twenty-seven court orders 
applied for was refused. The most common interception was 
conducted by the telephone wiretap (96.3 percent) of a single-family 
dwelling (51.9 percent), for either gambling (85.2 percent) or 
narcotics (11.1 percent) offenses, for a period of thirty days and at an 
average cost of $5,020. While 44.53 percent of the total interceptions 
were found to be incriminating, roughly 4.2 percent of all persons 
whose conversations were recorded were found guilty of the 
offense(s) charged.5 
The following charts were included among the data provided to 
the genetal assembly in the 1978 report. 
1. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § ID-409(c) (Supp. 1977). 
2. A full calendar year could not be reported because of the July, 1977 effective date 
of the Act. 
3. Among those not reporting was Maryland's Office of the Attorney General. The 
Attorney General's Office conducted one wiretap under the order of the Baltimore 
Supreme Bench during the period from July 1 through December 31, 1977. A 
business phone was tapped for 23 days at a cost of $750 for the specified offenses 
of bribery and extortion. At the conclusion of grand jury proceedings, the 
Attorney General's Office anticipates that two persons will be arrested as the 
result of the wiretapping conducted. See OFFICE OF THE ATT'y GENERAL, REPORT 
OF APPLICATION &IOR ORDER AUTHORIZING INTERCEPTION AND POLICE & 
COURT ACTION RESULTING FROM INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATION (Feb. 14, 1978). 
4. Carroll, Charles, Somerset and Talbot Counties. 
5. The report notes, however, that some of the 111 persons arrested are still 
awaiting trial. 
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WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
PURSUANT TO § lo-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE 
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31,1977 
REPORTS BY JUDGES 
Reporting Official Authorizing 
Number· Application Offense 
BALTIMORE CITY 
(Criminal Court) 
1 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
2 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
3 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
4 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
5 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
6 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
7 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
8 State's Attorney Narcotics 
BALTIMORE COUNTY 
(Circuit Court) 
1 State's Attorney Gambling Conspiracy 
CARROLL COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
CHARLES COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
HARFORD COUNTY 
(Circuit Court) 
1 State's Attorney Gambling 
2 State's Attorney Gambling 
3 State's Attorney Gambling 
4 State's Attorney Gambling 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
(Circuit Court) 
1 State's Attorney Gambling 
2 State's Attorney Gambling 
3 State's Attorney Gambling 
4 State's Attorney Gambling 
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY 
(Circuit Court) 
1 State's Attorney Gambling 
2 State's Attorney Gambling 
3 State's Attorney Gambling 
4 State's Attorney Gambling 
5 State's Attorney Gambling 
6 State's Attorney Gambling 
7 State's Attorney Gambling 
8 State's Attorney Narcotics Conspiracy 
9 State's Attorney Narcotics Conspiracy 
SOMERSET COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
































1 State's Attorney Murder Conspiracy PW 
• Corresponds to same number on reports by prosecuting officers. 
, TYPE: PW = Phone wire; ME = Microphone-eavesdrop. 
2 LOCATION: S = Single family dwelling; A = Apartment; B = Business location; PP = Pay phone; NR = 
Not reported. 
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WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
PURSUANT TO § IO-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE 
JULY - DECEMBER 31, 1977 
REPORTS BY JUDGES 
AUTHORIZED LENGTH 
Original Total 
Date of Order Number of Length 
Location2 Application (Days) Extensions (Days) 
B 09/29/77 30 30 
B 10110177 30 30 
S 10/25177 30 30 
S 1012:1177 30 30 
S 1012:1177 30 30 
S 11102177 30 30 
S 11/04177 1 1 
S 11/29177 30 30 
B 11/17177 30 30 
B 11/15/77 60 60 
S 12/08177 30 30 
S 12/14177 30 30 
B 12/14177 30 30 
S 07/19177 20 20 
S 08106177 20 20 
A 08/06177 20 20 
A 10/13177 16 16 
pp 08/10177 23 NOT EXECUTED 
pp 08116177 20 NOT EXECUTED 
pp 08/18/77 23 NO INFORMATION FILED 
S 09/06177 30 30 
S 09/01177 20 20 
A 09/14/77 20 20 
S 09/23177 20 20 
A 0912:1177 21 3 40 
S 11126177 21 21 
NR 10/23177 30 30 
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WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
PURSUANT TO § lo-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE 
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1977 
REPORTS BY PROSECUTING OFFICERS 
Number of Average NUMBER OF 
Days Number of Conversations 
Reporting· in Intercepts of Individuals Intercepts 
Number Operation per Day Intercepted 
BALTIMORE CITY 
24 8 10 184 
2 20 15 15 303 
3 18 21 24 380 
4 15 7 8 118 
5 15 14 9 223 
6 4 19 6 78 
7 1 35 4 35 
8 NO REPORT FILED 
BALTIMORE COUNTY 
19 5hrs. 30 831 
CARROLL COUNTY-REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
CHARLES COUNTY-REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
HARFORD COUNTY 
1 7 NO INFORMATION FILED 
2 8 26 68 215 
3 4 5 20 34 
4 4 5 33 162 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
1 8 NO INFORMATION FILED 
2 5 NO INFORMATION FILED 
3 5 NO INFORMATION FILED 
4 NO INFORMATION FILED 




4 23 8 15 130 
5 6 RELATED TO NO.6 
6 20 35 139 2,987 
7 8 75 23 423 
8 40 16 135 3,273 
9 8 8 7 --:!68 
SOMERSET COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
TALBOT COUNTY - REPORT FILED INDICATING NO ACTIVITY 
WICOMICO COUNTY 
2 15 16- 31 



























RELATED TO NO.3 
RELATED TO NO.5 
$ 4,250 $ 250 
RELATED TO NO.5 
$11,547 $ 203 
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SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON 
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
PURSUANT TO § 1()-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE 
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31,1977 




Application Offense Specified 
BALTIMORE CITY 
9 Criminal Court of 
Baltimore 
Attorney General 



















• Corresponds to same number on report by prosecuting officer_ 
1 TYPE: PW = Phone wire_ 









SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON 
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
PURSUANT TO § lo-409(c) OF THE COURTS ARTICLE 










REPORTS BY JUDGES 
AUTHORIZED LENGTH 
Date of Original 
Application Order Number of 
(Days) Extensions 
11/20177 26 








* Corresponds to same number on report by prosecuting officer. 
1 TYPE: PW = Phone wire. 
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STATE-WIDE SUMMARY OF WIRETAPPING AND 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR JULY 1 -
DECEMBER 31, 1977 
OFFENSE LOCATION 
Gambling - 23 (85.2%) Single Family 
Dwelling 
Narcotics 3 (11.1%) Apartment 




CONVERSATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 
INTERCEPTED 
562 
ARRESTS DURING PERIOD 
III 
- 14 ( 51.9%) 
4 ( 14.8%) 
5 ( 18.5%) 
3( 11.1%) 




TYPE OF DEVICE 
Phone Wiretap - 26( 96.3%) 
Microphone/eavesdrop - 1 ( 3.7%) 
27 (100.0%) 
INCRIMINATING INTERCEPTS 




• NOTE: IT SHOULD BE OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THOSE ARRESTED ARE STILL PENDING 
TRIAL. 
